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FOREWORD (to Berlin Pamphlet)

For the third time in just over 13 years, the Soviets have launched a major threat to the freedom of West Berlin. We and our Western Allies are pledged to protect that freedom. I am confident that we and our Allies and the stalwart people of West Berlin will meet this challenge, united in our strength and calm in the knowledge that our duty is plain.

This pamphlet sets forth some of the basic facts about Berlin, the repeated assaults on its freedom, and our obligations. It outlines also our patient and persistent efforts to resolve the issues involved by peaceful means and the obstacles placed in the way of a peaceful settlement by the Soviet Union. I believe that it will provide useful background for the informed citizen. Public understanding of both the necessary firmness and the full uses of the processes of diplomacy will contribute to the prospects for peace.

August 2, 1961

Dean Rusk

Secretary of State

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BERLIN--1961

A FEW BASIC FACTS:

Berlin lies more than 100 miles behind the Iron Curtain in the Soviet-occupied eastern zone of Germany. It is not, however, part of that zone. It is a separate political entity for which the four major allies of the war against Nazi tyranny are jointly responsible. Its special status stems from the fact that it was the capital not only of Hitler's Third Reich but of the German nation formed in the latter half of the 19th Century. In essence, the four major allies agreed to hold Berlin, as the traditional capital, in trust for a democratic and united Germany.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, comprising the former occupation zones of the western Allies, political democracy has been fully established. The 53,000,000 people of western Germany enjoy self-determination at all levels. Through their freely elected federal government, they

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have taken their place in the community of free nations.

By contrast, the 16,000,000 inhabitants of the eastern zone are ruled by the Soviet Union through its Communist creature, the East German regime which calls itself the "German Democratic Republic". That regime is neither democratic nor a republic. It was not chosen by the people it controls and has never been freely endorsed by them. It was imposed by duress and is maintained by all the oppressive apparatus of a police state backed by the military forces of the Soviet Union.

Berlin contains four sectors. The 2,200,000 inhabitants of its three western sectors live under a municipal government which they have freely chosen. The eastern sector has some 1,100,000 inhabitants. In 1946, in violation of their commitments, the Soviets separated it from the rest of the city. Subsequently, in further violation of their commitments, they permitted their German agents to declare it to be the capital of the East German puppet regime. Thus the people of East Berlin, like those of the eastern zone of Germany, are ruled by a regime they did not choose.

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The government of West Berlin is the only freely elected government behind either the Iron or the Bamboo Curtain. Repeatedly the Soviets and their German puppets have sought to blot out this island of freedom. Their methods have ranged from the brazen to the devious, but their purpose has always been clear except to the uninformed or naive.

Khrushchev has called Free Berlin "a cancerous tumor" and "a bone stuck in our throat". He has publicly declared his resolve "to eradicate this splinter from the heart of Europe."

Every President of the United States since the second world war has deemed the defense of Free Berlin critically important to the security of the United States and of the entire free world. The United States stands pledged to defend West Berlin by whatever means may be necessary. So do the governments of Great Britain and France. All the other 12 members of NATO stand pledged to support them in meeting this obligation.

These solemn commitments were not undertaken lightly. If the reasons

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why they were undertaken and must be honored are not self-evident, they

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become so when one reviews the history of the last 10 years.

THE ALLIED TRUSTEESHIP:

The nations which bore the major burden of liberating Europe, including Germany, from the aggressive Nazi tyranny were agreed that Germany should never again be permitted to become a threat to peace. To that end they agreed on the total defeat and destruction of the Nazi regime and occupation of all Germany by Allied military forces. Long before the Nazi surrender, the U. S. S. R., the U. S., and the U. S. agreed on the areas their respective military forces would occupy and temporarily administer. The basic document was signed in London on September 12, 1944, by representatives of the three powers. It specifically set aside Greater Berlin as a separate area to be occupied and administered jointly by all three. It made crystal clear that Greater Berlin was not a part of any zone of occupation. Later--on July 20, 1945--France was admitted to partnership in the occupation, with a zone in Western Germany.

and a sector and joint responsibilities in Berlin. Stalin had acceded reluctantly, with the condition that the French zone and sector be carved out of those previously assigned to Britain and the United States.

Meanwhile, at the Potsdam Conference, July 17 - August 2, 1945, the heads of government of the U. S. S. R., the U. K., and the U. S. agreed on certain more specific measures to be applied in Germany. These included reparations and the eradication of the National Socialist Party and all Nazi institutions and propaganda. They included also positive measures to prepare for the "eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic

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basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany."

Under the Potsdam Protocol, more popularly known as the Potsdam Agreement, local government was to be developed immediately on democratic principles through elective councils. As soon as practicable, elections were to be held for regional, provincial, and state (Land) governments. At all these levels, the occupation authorities were pledged to encourage all democratic political parties by granting them rights of assembly and public discussion.

For the time being, Germany was not to have a central government. But it was to be treated as a single economic unit and "certain essential German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries" were to be established in the fields of finance, transport, communication, foreign trade, and industry. These were to act under the supervision of the Allied Control Council, the central governing body for the four occupation zones.

The Potsdam Conference agreed in principle to the ultimate transfer

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to the Soviet Union of the city of Koenigsberg and adjacent areas. Pending a peace treaty, it assigned to Polish administration the pre-war German territories lying east of the Oder and Western Neisse Rivers. During the war, the major allies had leaned, in one degree or another, toward the division of Germany into several separate states. But in declaring that Germany was to be treated as a single economic unit, the Potsdam Agreement clearly indicated that Germany, after readjustment of its boundaries, was to be re-established as one nation. In setting "eventual peaceful cooperation in international life" as a goal, the Potsdam Protocol spoke of "Germany", not of two or more Germanies.

In other words, by this time the western Allies had succeeded in rising above their bitter indignation and moral revulsion over the inhuman atrocities perpetrated by the Nazi regime and the loss of life and property inflicted upon their peoples by Hitler's military forces. They looked to

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the future and their joint responsibilities for creating international conditions which would promote social and economic progress in political freedom to be enjoyed equally by all peoples of the world. Accordingly, they decided that the splintering into separate states of a people such as the Germans could only contribute to the creation of new frustrations and instability, which would threaten world peace anew. Whatever may have been his reasons, ^{McGraw} ^{Stalin} also advocated at this time a single Germany.

^{McGraw} In his "Proclamation to the People" of May 2, 1945, he had declared that "the Soviet Union... does not intend to dismember or destroy Germany."

Thus the major allies became trustees for a reformed Germany--- trustees for all the peoples who had fought against or suffered from Nazi aggressions and other crimes. Not least, they were trustees for the people of Germany. The reformed Germany to which they committed themselves was to be peaceable, self-governing through democratic political processes, and eventually united.

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At the heart of this trusteeship was Berlin, the traditional national capital. Although geographically it lay deep within the Soviet occupation zone--indeed much closer to the Oder-Neisse line than to the western boundary of the Soviet zone--not even Stalin was presumptuous enough then to suggest that it should be under exclusive Soviet custody. He agreed that the administration of Berlin was the joint responsibility of all four of the major allies and that it should be administered as a unit. Such were the main terms of the trusteeship to which the major allies--the U. S. S. R. as well as the three Western Powers--bound themselves.

THE RIGHT OF ACCESS TO BERLIN:

The Western Powers obviously could not perform their duties and exercise their rights in Berlin without the right to transport troops and supplies from their own zones of occupation. Their right of free access to

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Berlin was thus plainly inherent in their right to be in Berlin. This was confirmed by Stalin in his reply of June 18, 1945, to President Truman's cable of June 14 concerning the withdrawal of American troops from the Soviet occupation zone and their entry into Berlin. Mr. Truman stipulated, among other things, "free access by air, road, and rail from Frankfort and Bremen to Berlin for United States forces." Stalin promised to take "all necessary measures" in accordance with the plan stated by Mr. Truman.

Ten days later representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States agreed on arrangements for use by the Western powers of specific roads, rail lines, and air lanes between the Western occupation zones and Berlin. These arrangements were further defined by actions of the Allied control machinery in Berlin and, in due course, extended to the French. With these guarantees, U. S. troops entered Berlin on July 1, 1945.

The Western rights of access to Berlin plainly embraced the right to transport food and other supplies for the civilian population of Berlin. And the

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right of the people of Berlin to receive goods from, and export goods to, the Western zones and beyond was plainly inherent in the special political status accorded to Berlin. It was further buttressed by the Potsdam Agreement that Germany should be treated as an economic unit. In point of fact, in September 1945, the Soviet Commander, Marshal Zhukov, insisted on a step which made Berlin more dependent on shipments from the west than it otherwise would have been. He notified his opposite numbers that the Soviet zone could no longer supply the food which normally had gone to Berlin. The western Powers were thus compelled to assume instantly the responsibility for feeding the inhabitants of the city's western sectors.

SOVIET CONDUCT BEFORE THE BLOCKADE:

Soviet troops captured Berlin and held it for approximately ten weeks before troops of the western Allies were admitted. The western Armies did not attempt to capture Berlin. The Supreme Allied Commander, General Eisenhower, believed that his forces could be more usefully employed elsewhere in ending German military resistance and forcing unconditional surrender.

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As a result, when the Germans surrendered, the Western armies held much more, and the Soviet forces much less, than the areas assigned to them by the Four-Power occupation agreement reached many months earlier. The British and American forces relinquished to the Russians three historic German provinces and part of a fourth with a total population of more than 8,000,000----nearly half the area and half the people of the eastern zone.

About 70 percent of the buildings in Berlin had been destroyed or severely damaged by Allied bombs and shells. During their weeks of sole occupation, the Soviet authorities systematically removed most of the usable machinery and equipment which had survived the war. Their spoils included machines and tools from the larger plants, generators from power stations, most of the buses, undamaged street-cars and subway trains, and 62 automatic telephone exchanges with a capacity of 250,000 lines. This systematic Soviet looting added much to the burden of the

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Berlin.

The Soviets took advantage of their capture of Berlin to appoint a provisional government of the city and its subdivisions. They took special care to plant reliable agents in the police.

The Western Allies, however, successfully insisted on the right of the people of Berlin to elect their own government. In preparation for this, the Soviet authorities tried to force a merger of the non-communist Social Democratic Party (SPD) with the Communist Party (KPD) into the Socialist Unity Party (SED). They succeeded in the eastern zone of Germany where they held full power. But, in Berlin, under joint Allied control, they failed. Even so, they probably expected the Communists to do well in the city elections. Several districts of Berlin had been Communist strongholds during the Weimar Republic, and the Communists appointed to key city and subdivision posts by the Soviets could reasonably be expected to deliver votes.

The Berlin elections were held October 20, 1946. The result: Social Democratic Party (SPD) 48.7%; Christian Democratic Party (CDU) 22.2; Socialist Unity Party (SED) 19.8; Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 9.3. Thus the Communists won less than one-fifth of the vote and only one-fifth of the seats in the city parliament, which proceeded to elect a Social Democrat as Mayor. In April, 1947, he was repudiated by the parliament because he had signed a promise to cooperate with the SED: He resigned, and on June 24, 1947, parliament elected Social Democrat Ernst Reuter as Mayor. The Soviets "vetoed" Reuter's election. Until December 1948, a Deputy Mayor conducted the city's affairs.

The Soviets also systematically obstructed the efforts of the legally elected city government to control the city police, as authorized by the Kommandatura (the Allied governing body for Berlin). Instead, Soviet agents

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in the police took orders only from Soviet officials. Eventually the city government, with Western support, established control over the police in the western sectors. But, in the Soviet sector, the Communist police officials defied to the end the orders of the Kommandatura and the Berlin Government.

The elections of October 20, 1946, were the last, as well as the first, city-wide elections held in postwar Berlin. The Soviets could not prevent self-determination in the western sectors. But never again did they allow the inhabitants of the Soviet sector to choose their government.

Meanwhile, in the eastern zone of Germany and by its conduct in the Allied Control Council for Germany, the Soviet Union had been making crystal clear its determination to sterilize most of the positive principles of the Potsdam Protocol. Instead of encouraging, or even permitting, reconstruction of German political life on the democratic basis of free choice, it riveted Communist control on government at all levels. It began by appointing seasoned German Communists to key posts. Most of them

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had spent the Nazi period in the Soviet Union and now returned to Germany with the Soviet armies. Others had weathered the war in the underground or in concentration camps. These German Communists, with Soviet backing, systematically set out to harass, muzzle, intimidate, subdue, and destroy all opposition. A favorite device was the single ticket chosen by the Communists. The largest non-Communist party in the Soviet Zone, the Social Democratic Party, was brought to heel by compelling it to merge with the Communist Party. Within the resultant Socialist Unity Party, the Communists rapidly established domination. Several other political parties were, and still are, allowed to exist for show purposes but under tight Communist rein.

Simultaneously by similar tactics, the Soviets and their local Communist agents were imposing their control on Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia, in flagrant violation of the pledges of free elections made by Stalin in the Yalta declarations on Poland and on Liberated Europe.

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In the western zones of Germany, by contrast, the basic right of self-determination was not only permitted but fostered. All non-Nazi parties and candidates, including the Communists, were allowed to compete on even terms as the political life of Germany was reconstructed on a democratic basis, beginning with local elections and rising, by stages, to state (Land) elections. Despite complete freedom of activity, the Communists were so unsuccessful in West German elections that they eventually failed to obtain the five percent of the popular vote required to gain seats in parliament.

The Soviets also blocked or evaded execution of the provisions of the Potsdam Protocol for treating Germany as an economic unit and for allowing reconstruction and self-support. In December 1945, they vetoed a proposal to open zonal borders to travel by Germans. When the Western Powers asked them to place manufactures from East Germany in a common pool to meet the costs of essential imports, in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement, they did not deny the agreement but failed to comply with it. Meanwhile, they had looted the Eastern zone and refused to account for what they had

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taken. They also commandeered and shipped eastward almost the entire agricultural yield of their zone.

In the late spring and early summer of 1946, the disagreements within the Allied Control Council were taken up at the session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the four occupation powers. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes pointed out that, contrary to the Potsdam Agreement, Germany was being administered "in four closed compartments with the movements of people, trade, and ideas between the zones more narrowly restricted than between most independent countries." Consequently, he stated, none of the zones was self-supporting and Germany was threatened with economic paralysis. He proposed prompt establishment of central German administrative agencies, free trade between zones, and a balanced program of imports and exports. The British agreed at once. The French agreed on condition that the Saar be excluded from the

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jurisdiction of the proposed German agencies. The Soviets, using the French condition as a pretext, rejected the entire proposal.

On September 6, 1946, Secretary Byrnes made a major policy speech at Stuttgart in which he said bluntly that the Allied Control Council was "neither governing Germany nor allowing Germany to govern itself." He explained the impending economic merger of the British and American zones and laid down a positive economic program for all of Germany. This included drastic fiscal reform to prevent ruinous inflation, organization of transportation, communications, and postal service throughout the country without regard to zonal barriers, and a central administrative department for agriculture to improve production and distribution of food. He also stressed the importance of permitting Germany to increase industrial production and organize the most effective use of her raw materials, granting that she must share her coal and iron with the liberated countries of Europe. That fall the British and American zones were merged for economic purposes. France

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held back, hoping that differences with the Soviets could be resolved at the fourth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers scheduled for March, 1947, in Moscow. The hope proved vain. The Soviets were obdurate. They remained obdurate at the fifth session at London in November and December, 1947.

The Soviets proposed at that conference a strongly centralized German government. It was a fair inference that they expected to gain control of all of Germany. The Western delegates concluded that agreement with the Soviets could be reached "only under conditions which would not only enslave the Germany people but would seriously retard the recovery of all Europe."

Soviet objectives in Europe had become increasingly plain. The first was to rivet Communist regimes on all the areas of eastern and central Europe which the Red armies had occupied during and at the end of the war. The second and larger objective was to extend Communist domination over

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the independent nations of western and southern Europe. The Soviets were actively supporting an aggression against Greece, euphemistically called a "civil war". They were strongly pressing Turkey for concessions which would jeopardize its independence and open the way for further Soviet expansion in the Mediterranean area and beyond. In Western Europe they were banking on economic stagnation and political paralysis to set the stage for Communist take-overs.

In March 1947, the United States moved to curb Soviet imperialist expansion by extending economic and military aid to Greece and Turkey and setting forth a general policy of such aid to other nations resisting covert or overt aggression. This quickly became known as the Truman Doctrine.

The United States had already made large contributions to relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction in Europe. Through UNRRA (The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) it had helped eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, as well as western Europe. It had made a large loan

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to Great Britain and emergency loans and grants to various other nations. But these had proved insufficient to reinvigorate the economies of the Western European nations. A larger, sustained effort was obviously necessary. In June, 1947, in a speech at Harvard, Secretary of State George C. Marshall set in motion what became the great cooperative recovery program known as the Marshall Plan.

The central conflict of purpose was set forth in Secretary Marshall's report to the nation following the breakdown of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December, 1947:

"The issue is really clear-cut, and I fear there can be no settlement until the coming months demonstrate whether or not the civilization of western Europe will prove vigorous enough to rise above the destructive effects of the war and restore healthy society. Officials of the Soviet Union and leaders of the Communist Parties openly predict that this restoration will not take place. We, on the other hand, are confident in the rehabilitation

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of Western European civilization with its freedoms."

Fortunately for the future of civilization, the Soviets were unable to prevent the economic recovery of western Europe, including the western zones of Germany. Likewise, they were unable to prevent the political reconstruction of western Germany on a democratic basis. On March 6, 1948, with the concurrence of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, the Western Allies agreed to fuse their zones economically and politically. They agreed also on a new Occupation Statute which, while reserving essential powers to the Allies, enabled West Germans to participate in the community of free peoples through a Federal government of their own choosing. On June 18, the Western military governors announced a reform basic to West Germany's economic recovery: the substitution of a sound currency, the Deutschemark (or D-Mark), for the inflated Reichsmark.

The Soviets responded to those constructive measures by a series of violations of their commitments, culminating in a total blockade of West Berlin.

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THE BLOCKADE AND THE AIRLIFT:

On March 20, 1948, the Soviets walked out of the Allied Control Council for Germany. On April 1, they imposed rail and road restrictions on Allied traffic to Berlin. On June 16, they walked out of the Berlin Kommandatura. On June 23, German Communists staged riots around the Berlin City Hall, situated in the Soviet sector. Many of them were carried to the scene in Soviet trucks. This was the day currency reforms were introduced in Berlin. The Western Allies had not previously extended to Berlin the West German currency reform of June 18. They were willing to retain the old Reichsmark in Berlin, provided that they shared control over the amounts issued. The Soviets refused to share this control. Instead they introduced a new currency of their own in both the Soviet zone and sector. The Allies promptly introduced the new D-Mark into the Western sectors of the city.

On June 24, the Soviets totally severed all land and water

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routes between Berlin and the western zones of Germany. Their undisguised intent was to force the Western allies out of Berlin and starve the people of the city into the Communist fold.

In response to this bald aggression against their rights and the freedom of the people of Berlin, the Western Allies would have been fully justified in using force, to whatever degree necessary to reopen and maintain surface routes to Berlin. Instead, they chose to supply Berlin by air.

For the next eleven months every pound of food and coal, and all else necessary to keep alive the people of West Berlin and supply the forces of the Western Allies in Berlin, was transported by air. In a total of 277,728 flights, American, British, and French airmen brought in 2,343,301 tons of food and supplies. At the peak of the Airlift, planes were landing in West Berlin at the rate of one every 45 seconds.

Why didn't the Soviets try to stop the Airlift? Initially they probably did not dream that it was possible for Western Berlin and the Allied forces in it to be sustained by air. A little later they probably thought that the fog

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and snows of winter would bring the Airlift to a halt. Perhaps most influential was the fact that they could not seriously interfere with the Airlift without shooting down Allied planes. That they knew better than to risk.

The Airlift had its casualties, nevertheless--72 men, including 31 Americans, lost their lives in accidents. Their names are perpetuated on a soaring monument in front of Tempelhof Airport. A Berlin foundation, "Airlift Gratitude", provides scholarships for the children of these fallen heroes. In due course, they may, if they wish, attend the Free University of Berlin as guests of the Free Berlin government. That university was born under the Airlift when many teachers and students from the old University of Berlin, situated in the Soviet sector, chose freedom in the western sectors. It held its first classes by candle-light in nine cold rooms in an old building. The Free University of Berlin, with more than 12,000 students, has become one of the world's great institutions of higher education. Today one-fourth

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The Airlift is an indelible chapter in the history of the defense of freedom. So is the fortitude of the people of Berlin during the blockade. They subsisted on a slim diet. During the winter, as fuel was scarce, they were usually miserably cold. For months electric current was on only three hours in 24. The Berliners proved themselves worthy of the fraternity of free peoples. Admiration for their courage and endurance helped greatly in rehabilitating the name of the German people in the eyes of the world.

The common experience of the blockade forged a lasting bond of friendship among Berliners, Americans, and their Allies. Every noon the ringing of the Freedom Bell from the tower of the West Berlin City Hall serves as a reminder of their common cause. The Freedom Bell was a gift from the American people---millions of them, including school children, voluntarily contributed to the fund to make and install it. It was inspired by the Liberty Bell enshrined in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, which in

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1776 pealed the tidings of the American Declaration of Independence, with its immortal truths "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness," and that governments derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed."

Unhappily, during the Airlift the inhabitants of the eastern sector lost most of the limited freedom they had briefly enjoyed. In addition, the Communists began Nazi-like maneuvers to capture control of the entire city from within. Repeatedly, on Soviet orders, they rioted around City Hall, still located in East Berlin. They even forced their way inside the building and injured some of the West Berlin deputies, including women. On November 30, 1948, the Soviets formally split the city. The vast majority of legally-elected deputies withdrew to West Berlin. A new "rump" municipal government was set up in East Berlin,

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with the promise of free elections. Those elections were never held. Moreover, in violation of a specific pledge earlier given, the Soviets prohibited East Berliners from voting in the city-wide elections

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of December 5, 1948. Barred from returning to City Hall in the Soviet sector, the new parliament set up headquarters in West Berlin and elected Ernst Reuter as Mayor. Legally he was Mayor of the entire city. Actually, of course, he could exercise authority only in its western sectors.

In the spring of 1949, the Soviet Union tacitly admitted failure in its first great effort to oust the Western Powers and swallow all of Berlin. Soviet-U. S. diplomatic conversations in New York led to a Four-Power agreement on May 4, 1949,* providing in part:

"All the restrictions imposed since March 1, 1948, by the Government of the Soviet Socialist Republic on communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany and between the Eastern zone and the Western zones will be removed on May 12, 1949."

This article was implemented on May 9 by Order No. 36 of the Soviet Military Government and Commander in Chief of the Soviet occupation forces in Germany. It was reaffirmed, strengthened, and amplified the following month by the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris.

The Soviet Union did not faithfully adhere to its renewed pledges. In

* It is perhaps not insignificant that the North Atlantic defense pact had been signed April 4--exactly a month previously.

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January 1950, it began a "creeping blockade", designed to wreck the now recovering economy of West Berlin. With persistent interference with transport and deliveries, it combined a violent propaganda campaign intended to frighten the West Berliners. These were only the first of a long series of harassments.

BERLIN AFTER THE BLOCKADE:

With the end of the blockade, Free Berliners set about energetically to rebuild their city and revive its industries. They completed the task of clearing away war ruins and rubble and of restoring public parks and gardens. They re-equipped factories and power plants and built new ones. (An immense new electric power plant, its giant generators flown in piece by piece during the blockade, made West Berlin independent of Communist-controlled sources of power.)

Distance and related handicaps made it hard for Free Berlin's

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industries to compete with West German and foreign firms. In 1955 the Communists added to these handicaps by increasing drastically tolls on highway traffic between West Germany and Berlin. But through driving initiative, hard work, and Marshall Plan aid--which, directly and indirectly, totalled almost one billion dollars--Free Berlin's industrial output rapidly grew. New office buildings, apartment houses, and hotels sprang up. Stores and shops began to bulge with all the goods that the advanced technology and manufacturing techniques of the West can provide. In recent years, Berlin's industrial growth has been assisted by subsidies from the Federal German Republic.

Free Berlin has again become Germany's greatest industrial city and the greatest metropolis between Paris and Moscow. Since the end of the Blockade, approximately 320,000 new jobs have been created in Free Berlin. Every day more than 50,000 East Berliners come to work in Free Berlin. (About 7,000 West Berliners work

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in East Berlin.)

Although somewhat below that of West Germany, the average standard of living in Free Berlin is far above that of any city anywhere in the Communist world. Incidentally, more than 200,000 West Berliners own automobiles. In the last few years, the Soviets and their German puppets have striven to make East Berlin a show-place. Despite their efforts, East Berlin remains a drab place compared to Free Berlin.

The high standard of living in Free Berlin is not confined to material things. Free Berlin has become a great cultural center, where one may enjoy not only the best in German culture but samplings of the culture of other Western nations.

Most important of all, the people of West Berlin read what they please, think and speak as they please, and vote as they please.

East Berliners and East Germans like to visit Free Berlin. In 1960 they bought 560,000 tickets to West Berlin theatres and opera, and 10,000,000

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to West Berlin movie houses. They borrowed 250,000 books from Free Berlin libraries.

THE POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF WEST GERMANY:

The blockade of Berlin did not halt the political reconstruction of West Germany. On September 1, 1948, the West German Parliamentary Council convened in Bonn, under the chairmanship of Dr. Konrad Adenauer, anti-Nazi former Mayor of Cologne, to draft a provisional constitution (or Basic Law, as it is called). The Council completed its work in May, 1949. On August 14, 1949, the people of West Germany voted in the first free general election Germany had known since 1932. On September 21, the Federal Republic of Germany came into being with Dr. Adenauer, leader of

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the Christian Democratic Party, as its Chancellor.

THE SOVIETS SET UP AN EAST GERMAN PUPPET REGIME:

On October 7, 1949, the Soviet authorities set up their puppet regime in the eastern zone of Germany.

In 1951 the United Nations set up a special commission to determine whether conditions were suitable for the holding of free elections throughout Germany. This U. N. Commission was unable to complete its task because it was barred from the Soviet zone of Germany and Soviet sector of Berlin.

With Soviet support and in further violation of the Four Power agreements, the imposed East German regime proclaimed the Soviet sector of Berlin to be its capital.

In the Spring of 1950, the Soviet Union began arming East German forces,

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at first under the guise of "People's Police". The western Allies protested, but to no avail. By the end of 1953, East Germany, with only 17,000,000 people, had 140,000 military personnel, including three mechanized divisions and an air force, plus 100,000 armed police. This was more than a year before the establishment of an armed force

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by the Federal Republic, which had only 150,000 regular police for a population three times that of East Germany.

In a series of steps in 1954 and 1955 the Soviets purported to grant their East German puppet full sovereignty. Among other things, they transferred to it control of the borders with the Federal Republic and west Berlin and over German traffic between the two areas. The Western Powers emphatically reminded the Soviet Union that these arrangements did not alter its obligations under its prior and overriding agreements with them regarding Germany, including Berlin.

As the East German puppet regime was unlawfully created and does not rest on the consent of the governed, but is kept in power by the apparatus of a police state backed by military forces of the Soviet Union, the western nations have refused to recognize it. So have all other non-Communist nations.

What a great majority of the East Germans and East Berliners think of their Communist masters has been manifested in many ways. One telling testimonial was the spontaneous strike against new Communist work "norms" which boiled up in East Berlin on June 17, 1953. Almost simultaneously, spontaneous strikes and demonstrations occurred in East German cities. The East German puppet regime was unable to subdue these uprisings with its own police and troops. It had to call for Soviet armed forces. It was saved by Soviet tanks.

Most significantly, these strikes which became popular uprisings were led by construction and factory workers and other wage-earners--the very people whom the Communists claim particularly to represent. They were a revolt of the proletariat against the "dictatorship of the proletariat".

Another telling, and continuing, testimonial is the migration of East Germans and East Berliners to freedom in the West. After the experience of 1953, the Soviets and their German puppets decided not to exploit the

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East German workers quite so ruthlessly. Some foodstuffs have been almost chronically in short supply. In the early summer of 1961, strict rationing of several important foods was re-introduced. Nevertheless, average living levels in East Germany and East Berlin have risen appreciably, although they remain far below those of West Germany and West Berlin.

This material improvement has not, however, stayed the exodus of East Germans and East Berliners.

"PEOPLE WHO VOTE WITH THEIR FEET":

In the last 16 years, an estimated 3,300,000 Germans have fled East Germany and East Berlin. More than 2,500,000 of these have left since records began to be kept in West Berlin and the Federal German Republic in 1949. The border between East Germany and the Federal Republic is dangerous for a refugee to try to cross. The Communists guard it with barbed wire,

watch towers with sharp-shooters, and a "death strip" of plowed earth. Once a refugee reaches East Berlin, however, he can cross to West Berlin on foot or by subway or the elevated line--provided he acts like a commuter and carries no tell-tale luggage. Consequently, a large majority of the refugees from East Germany have escaped via West Berlin, whence most have been transported by air to refugee camps in the Federal German Republic. In these centers, arrangements are made for their housing and employment in West Germany.

The German Communists have applied increasingly strict measures to curb this trek to freedom. A refugee caught in the act is liable to imprisonment. So are his close relatives if they remain behind. Contrary to Communist propaganda, the Federal German Republic, the government of Free Berlin, and the Western Powers have not encouraged the exodus. In fact, high officials of the Federal Republic have often appealed to the population of the Soviet zone to remain there as long as they possibly can. They do not want

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to see East Germany depleted of its most stalwart elements. Above all, they do not want to give the Soviets an excuse to move non-German workers into East Germany. (Communist rule has combined with the West Berlin "escape hatch" to give East Germany a unique distinction in the world of today: a shrinking population.)

Nevertheless, the flow of refugees has continued. The rate varies but in recent years has averaged about 4,000 a week. In July, 1961, with a revival of Soviet pressures on Free Berlin and the threat to seal off this portal to freedom, the rate approximately doubled.* The refugees have included a high percentage of East German physicians and of various other professions but most are workers fleeing "the paradise of the workers." Significantly also, a majority have been young people--approximately 50 percent under 25 years of age. They were nine years or younger when the

* Almost certainly it would have risen still more if the frantic East German regime had not clamped new restrictions on travel from East Germany into West Berlin. The East German regime also instituted measures to reduce the number of East Berliners working in West Berlin.

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Soviets and their German puppets began to try to make them into Communists. (Incidentally, the German lass who won the Miss Universe contest at Miami in July, 1961, had fled East Germany only a year earlier. She is an electronics engineer.)

The unending trek of these East Germans and east Berliners who "vote with their feet" is an eloquent judgment on Communist rule.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC COMES OF AGE:

During the Nineteen-fifties, the German Federal Republic took its place as a partner in the world of self-governing peoples. On May 26, 1962, the three Western Powers signed Contractual Agreements ending the occupation status of West Germany, to take effect when the Federal Republic was integrated into the Western European defense community. They reserved only the rights necessary to fulfill their obligations in regard to Berlin, the unification of Germany, and a final peace settlement. They retained the right to station armed forces in Germany for "the defense of the free world, of

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which the Federal Republic and Berlin form part." On May 27, 1954, they pledged themselves again to maintain armed forces in Berlin "as long as their responsibilities require it" and reaffirmed their previous declaration that they would "treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves."

On October 3, 1954, the Federal Republic was admitted to full partnership in the western European Union (Brussels Treaty) and NATO. It accepted limits on both armaments and independent military action. On its behalf, Chancellor Adenauer voluntarily undertook not to manufacture atomic, biological, or chemical weapons. He also undertook not to produce long-range missiles, guided missiles, strategic bombers, and larger warships, except with the approval of the Council of Western European Union by a two-thirds vote. The Federal Republic placed all of its military forces under NATO command--the only NATO member to have done so.

Soviet propagandists attempt to promote the myth that the Soviet Union

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fears a rearmed German Federal Republic. In doing so, the Soviet

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leaders seek to play on sentiments still remaining from the Nazi experience. However, the fact is that, by deliberate policy of the Federal Republic, legitimate German security requirements are completely tied in with the 16-country NATO Alliance and its intricate international staff and command system, in which the U. S. plays a major role. Moreover, the Federal Republic is a strong supporter of the movement toward European integration through the European Common Market, the European Atomic Energy Community, and the European Coal and Steel Community, which are well on the road toward creating a united Europe. These Atlantic and European institutions leave no room for genuine fears. The Soviet leaders know this full well.

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Through wise policies, driving initiative, and hard work, West Germany's economic recovery surged forward. Its rate of increase in gross national product became one of the highest in the world.

For twelve years now West Germany has been a fully-functioning political democracy, with regular free elections at all levels from local to national, free speech, and all the other rights and safeguards for individual liberty essential to a self-governing society.

In these same twelve years, East Germany has moved just as rapidly in the opposite direction: toward increasing regimentation, collectivization, and progressive strangulation of individual liberties.

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FREE BERLIN AND FREE GERMANY:

As West Berlin remains under joint Allied trusteeship, it is not part of the German Federal Republic. But naturally the association between these two self-governing areas is close. The Federal Republic maintains various offices in Berlin. It gives financial support to the economy and cultural life of Free Berlin. Free Berlin has representatives in the Federal Parliament in Bonn, although they do not vote.

THE QUEST FOR A GERMAN PEACE SETTLEMENT:

After Stalin's death and the Korean truce in 1953, the Western Allies resumed their efforts to obtain a peace settlement for Germany as a whole. Another meeting of the Foreign Ministers, convened in Berlin

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January 25, 1954, proved fruitless. The Soviets made plain their resolve to keep East Germany in captivity and to permit its unification with West Germany only under conditions which would favor the extension of Communist control over all of Germany.

The Austrian State Treaty (more popularly known as the Austrian peace treaty), to which the Soviets finally acceded in May 1955, rekindled hope. And at the "summit" conference in Geneva in July 1955, the heads of government of the Big Four agreed, in a directive to their foreign ministers, that "the settlement of the German question and reunification of Germany by free elections shall be carried out in conformity with the national interest of the German people and the interest of European security."

At the subsequent Foreign Ministers' meeting, convened in October 1955, the Western Powers submitted proposals in full harmony with that directive. The Soviets insisted that unification be effected only

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by agreement between "two German states"--the freely constituted Federal Republic, then with some 50,000,000 inhabitants, and the puppet East German state with about 17,000,000. The fruitless conference adjourned on November 16.

In 1956 and 1957, President Eisenhower and other Western leaders sought further clarification of Soviet views. Moscow's responses were rigid. But in 1957, Premier Bulganin of the U. S. S. R. sought to persuade the Federal Republic to negotiate directly with the East German regime, first on trade, then on loose confederation. As the latter proposal, publicly advanced by the East German puppet President, made no provision for central authority or free elections, the Federal Republic rejected it. In this decision Chancellor Adenauer was fully supported by the leader of the opposition, the Social Democrat Erich Ollenhauer.

In July, 1957, the Western Powers, including the Federal Republic, tried again to reopen negotiations; coupling the reunification of Germany with

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European security arrangements which offered far-reaching assurances to the Soviet Union. Again they found themselves up against a stone wall.

In December, 1957, the Soviet Union called for a new "summit" conference. After consultation with NATO members, President Eisenhower agreed to participate, provided that the groundwork was laid through diplomatic channels and the Foreign Ministers. But the exchanges which followed yielded no progress.

THE SECOND MAJOR ASSAULT ON FREE BERLIN:

Late in 1958, the Soviet Union launched its second major assault on the freedom of West Berlin. The attack began with a speech by Khrushchev on November 10, another on November 26, and a note to the Western Powers on November 27, 1958. In that note the Soviet Union said that it considered null and void all of its agreements with the Western Allies as to Berlin and demanded the withdrawal of Western military forces from the city. It proposed to make West Berlin a demilitarized "free city."

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As to the reunification of Germany, it proposed that "the two German states" enter into negotiations looking toward a confederation (without free elections in the eastern zone).

The Soviet note set a deadline of six months. It said that if the Western allies had not acceded to its demands by then, the Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty with the "German Democratic Republic" and turn over to it control of all access routes to Berlin.

That arrogant and peace-disturbing note, like so many other documents emanating from Moscow, was replete with distortions and omissions of fact. (Corrections of some of the more obvious of these may be found in a pamphlet, Department of State Publication 6757, released in January, 1959, and entitled: "The Soviet Note on Berlin: An Analysis". As the Communists have continued to propagate these same distortions and to ignore the same significant facts, reading of this pamphlet is still recommended.)

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A few fundamental points may be noted here: The Soviet Union cannot take away the rights and obligations of the western Powers to remain in and protect Free Berlin. Those rights and obligations were not conferred by the Soviet Union but are rooted in the Nazi surrender. They include the right of access to Berlin. Likewise, the Soviet Union cannot unilaterally annul its agreements with the Western Allies as to Berlin, including its guarantees of access to the city. Those agreements can be altered only by consent of all Four Powers. The Soviet Union cannot legally divest itself of these commitments or transfer them to anyone else without approval of the western Powers.

In its reply of December 31, 1958, the United States rejected the Soviet demands and said that it could not embark on discussions with the Soviet Union "under menace of ultimatum." It nevertheless inquired if the Soviet Union were ready to enter into discussions among the Four Powers on the question of Berlin "in the wider framework of negotiations for a solution of the German problem as well as that of European security."

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Similar replies were sent by the United Kingdom and France.

On January 10, 1959, the Soviet Union proposed the calling of a peace conference and "summit" talks on Berlin and Germany, with participation by the "German Democratic Republic" and the Federal Republic of Germany. It did not mention, although it did not withdraw, the 6-month deadline.

Construing this as an implicit retreat from duress, the Western Powers, on February 16, informed the Soviet Government that they were prepared to take part in a Four Power Conference of Foreign Ministers to deal with the problem of Germany in all its aspects. They consented that German "advisers" be invited.

The Soviets eventually agreed. The Foreign Ministers Conference opened in Geneva on May 11, 1959. Representatives of the Federal Republic and of the East German regime were seated as advisers at tables separated by two pencils' width from the main table at which sat the representatives of the four negotiating powers.

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THE WESTERN PEACE PLAN:

On May 14, 1959, the Western Allies put forward a comprehensive peace plan which reached far to accommodate Soviet interests and views. It was a phased plan which did not insist on immediate free elections in East Germany but provided time for a mixed German committee to draft an electoral law and work out plans for increased trade and other contacts between the two parts of Germany. Interlocked with a series of steps toward the reunification of Germany were provisions for measures against surprise attack and for progressive reductions in military forces both in an area of Europe and by over-all ceilings on Soviet and U.S. military personnel.

This far-reaching plan, to be applied by stages, was designed to consolidate peace in Europe, east and west. The Soviets rejected it out of hand.

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THE SOVIET PLAN:

The Soviet Plan, presented on May 15, called for:

1. Separate peace treaties with the "two German states", the negotiation of reunification to be left to them, with no time limit, thus no assurance that Germany would ever be reunited or that free elections would ever be permitted in East Germany.

2. Pending German reunification, West Berlin to become a "free, demilitarized city", thus "occupation" by the Western Powers to end.

3. The NATO powers to withdraw their forces and dismantle all military bases on "foreign territory". The Soviets, in return, to withdraw their forces from East Germany, Poland, and Hungary.

The first point above should be labelled, as Secretary of State Christian A. Herter observed at the time, the "Soviet Treaty for the Permanent Partition of Germany." When combined with the third point,

however, it became a plan to weaken the security of West Germany, and indeed of all Free Europe, thus opening the way for eventual extension of the Communist domain.

The withdrawal of military forces from, and dismantling of military bases on, "foreign territory" is a staple item in Communist "peace" and "disarmament" proposals. It means the expulsion of American military power from the Eurasian continent and adjacent islands and the dissolution of NATO and the other alliances which restrain Communist expansion by military means. These alliances were brought into being by Communist threats and aggressions, notably the take-over in Czechoslovakia, the Berlin Blockade, and the attack in Korea. All are defensive, freely entered into by their members, and in strict conformity with the United Nations Charter. The participation of the United States is what gives them sufficient strength to deter or cope with major aggression. And the presence of American military forces at various key points on and near the Eurasian continent is the visible

to friend and foe alike, that we will honor our obligations.

In return for the withdrawal of Allied forces from West Germany and of American forces from all of Europe to the United States, more than 3,000 miles across the ocean, the Soviets offered to withdraw their forces a few hundred miles, whence they could return quickly. This was not a peace proposal but a design for conquest, by making the free nations of Europe vulnerable to Communist threats and eventually to outright attack.

THE PLAN FOR A "DEMILITARIZED FREE CITY":

The phrase "demilitarized free city" is appealing. As West Berlin is already a free city the key word is "demilitarized".

No one could seriously argue that the small contingents of Western troops in West Berlin, which actually number only 11,000, are a threat to peace. They are surrounded by 22 or more Soviet divisions plus the armed forces of the East German regime. In 16 years, they have not been

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responsible for a single provocative incident. They are kept there as proof and warning that the Western Allies will protect the freedom of West Berlin, come what may.

West Berlin has no troops of its own. And, as it is not part of the Federal Republic, no West German troops are stationed there. By contrast, East German armed forces are stationed in East Berlin. In the Communist May Day celebrations in 1959, 1960, and 1961 calling for the demilitarization of West Berlin, these East German forces, including tanks, were ostentatiously paraded in East Berlin. Those Communist military displays were an ominous hint of the probable eventual fate of West Berlin if it were stripped of military defenses.

At various times, the Soviets suggested or hinted at certain modifications of their proposal to demilitarize West Berlin. Khrushchev said that he

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"would even agree to the United States, Great Britain, France and the U. S. S. R. or neutral countries maintaining some sort of military forces in west Berlin." He suggested also the possibility of a United Nations guarantee.

If the Soviets really want to see the freedom of West Berlin preserved, why do they insist on a change in the present arrangement, which guarantees that freedom while preserving the peace? Khrushchev says that, since many years have elapsed since the Nazi surrender, it is time to do away with the occupation agreements. He likes to call the position of Berlin "abnormal".

If the position of Berlin is abnormal, it is because the situation in Germany is abnormal. The Soviets still prevent by force the unification of Germany, which would automatically settle the Berlin question, and even a free expression of the will of the people of West Germany and East Berlin on that or anything else.

In fact, by the standards of all who believe in self-determination, the

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situation throughout Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the whole Communist orbit is "abnormal". By that standard Free Berlin is, as its Mayor, Willy Brandt, has remarked, the only "normal" city situated anywhere within the Communist world.

The Western Powers made it plain that they are not wedded to any particular form of protection for the freedom of West Berlin, provided that it does not weaken the protection which now keeps West Berlin free. Suggestions that this task be turned over to the United Nations must be considered in the light of Khrushchev's assault on the U. N. Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, and his demand for a three-headed secretariat, or troika, in which each of the three would have a veto. That plan, if adopted, would paralyze the executive functions of the U. N. Secretariat.

In gauging Khrushchev's real intentions regarding West Berlin, it should be noted that the Soviet note of November 27, 1958, stated that "the most correct and natural solution" would be to absorb West Berlin into the

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"German Democratic Republic." Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko reiterated that on May 30, "If we are to speak frankly, the Soviet Government considers the creation of a Free City far from being an ideal solution of the West Berlin question. The most equitable approach to this question would be, of course, the extension to West Berlin of the full sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic. I think that the German Democratic Republic, whose capital the division of the city continues to mutilate, could with the fullest justification demand such a solution of the question."

The Soviet plan to make West Berlin a "demilitarized free city" is thus obviously intended as a temporary way station on the road to "the most correct and natural solution." If Khrushchev himself has left any doubt about that, Walter Ulbricht,* the No. 1 East German Communist, has not.

* Ulbricht received intensive training in Communist doctrine at the Lenin Institute in Moscow from 1926 to 1928. In 1937 or 1938 he returned to the Soviet Union and remained there during the war. He returned to Germany in 1945 as a colonel in the Soviet Army. The Soviet authorities installed him and other well-trained Communists in key positions in East Germany. He is reported to have held Soviet citizenship for several years.

Ulbricht's statements, several of which appear as Annex NO. , at times have the brutal candor of Hitler's "Mein Kampf".

KHRUSHCHEV'S WAR THREAT:

Since November, 1958, Khrushchev has repeatedly warned that if the western Allies did not settle the Berlin and German questions on terms satisfactory to him he would sign a separate peace treaty with the East German regime and turn over to it control of the access routes to Berlin.

Nobody can prevent Moscow from signing a "peace treaty" with this or any other of its puppets. This would be simply a ventriloquist stunt.

The threat to peace begins with the Communist contention that a "peace treaty" between Moscow and the East German regime would annul all Western rights pertaining to Berlin. What makes it grave is the Soviet threat to go to war if the Western Allies exercise their indubitable duty to prevent those rights from being extinguished.

Thus, when examined, Khrushchev's threat to make a separate peace

treaty with the East German regime is an aggressive move packed by the

threat of war.

It has been widely conjectured that the East Germans would not immediately try to restrict Western access, but would do so only gradually, a bit at a time. Such "salami" tactics would appear to be shrewd from the Communist viewpoint, as they might present difficulties to the Western Allies in deciding when to resist. But Ulbricht has indicated that he would like to apply at least one severe limitation at once: that he would try to close Tempelhof Airfield in West Berlin, compelling all air traffic to and from Berlin to use a field under East German control. This would close the main road to freedom for East Germans.

* IMPASSE AND ANOTHER APPROACH TO THE SUMMIT:

In mid-June, 1959, the Soviets brought the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva to a crisis. The conference recessed June 20, resumed July 13, and adjourned without tangible progress on August 5. Meanwhile, President Eisenhower invited Khrushchev to the United States. They

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conferred at some length during the Soviet leader's visit, which lasted from September 16 to September 27, 1959, and carried him from coast to coast. Khrushchev suspended his threat to sign a separate peace treaty with the East Germans. These talks and others at high level led to a Big Four "summit" meeting in Paris on May 18, 1960. That conference was never formally convened, although all the principals were on hand. Khrushchev used the U-2 incident to break it up. Some thought his real reason was his discovery prior to the conference that the Western Allies would not bow to his demands.

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The blow-up at the 'summit' and the 1960 national elections in the U. S. brought a pause in discussions with Moscow. Khrushchev did not remain silent or inactive, however. Among other things, he attended the U. N. General Assembly in New York from September 20 to October 13.*

After the elections conversations between Washington and Moscow were resumed through various channels. Certain small frictions between Moscow and Washington were eased, and Khrushchev indicated that he was willing to give the new U. S. President, John F. Kennedy, time to settle into his job before pressing serious negotiations.

THE THIRD ASSAULT:

Khrushchev did not wait long, however. He indicated during the winter and early spring months that he still regarded Berlin and Germany as

* It was on this trip that he launched his savage attack on the Secretary-General and became the first man in the history of the U. N. to express displeasure by taking off a shoe and pounding it on the table.

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urgent questions. Meanwhile he was pronouncing or aggravating trouble in Laos and elsewhere and making bellicose speeches.

President Kennedy decided, and Khrushchev concurred, that direct talks between them might be useful. These were held June 3-4, 1961, in Vienna. They were, in President Kennedy's word, "sombre".

A Soviet aide-memoire on Germany and Berlin, delivered June 4, marked the formal beginning of the third great assault on the Freedom of Berlin. The Western Allies replied on July 18. The text of the U. S. reply is published as Annex _____ and is self-explanatory.

The circumstances and tone of the third assault, together with Khrushchev's belligerent words at Vienna and elsewhere, suggest that in manufacturing another crisis over West Berlin the Soviets have far-reaching aims.

THE ALLIED TRUSTEESHIP--WHAT THE RECORD SHOWS:

The record shows that the Western Allies have been faithful to the

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trusteeship which they assumed in 1945. They have fostered the reconstruction of Germany as a peaceable, self-governing nation. Where they could prevail, they have performed what they promised.

The record shows that the Soviet Union, which joined in the same pledges, has dishonored them by a long chain of nonfeasances, misfeasances, and malfeasances. (In the limited space of this pamphlet only some of the major ones could be noted.) It has prevented the reunification of Germany and prohibited democratic self-government and self-determination in East Germany and East Berlin. It has repeatedly sought to extinguish freedom in West Berlin.

WHAT THE FREE BERLINERS WANT:

No one who believes in self-determination could be deaf to the ~~xx~~ clearly expressed wish of the people of Free Berlin. They have made it unmistakably plain that they want the Western Allies to stay as guardians and are adamantly opposed to any weakening in the protection they now enjoy.

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The status of Berlin was a key issue in the West Berlin elections of December, 1958, held just after Khrushchev issued his ultimatum. The candidates of the SED (Communist party) advocated a change. All other candidates of all other parties opposed any change. The Communists were as free as the others to advocate their cause. (Indeed, West Berlin police and firemen broke up anti-Communist demonstrations against Communist political rallies.) Ninety-six percent of the electorate voted. The Communists received only 1.9 percent of the vote cast. Such was the verdict of a people who know what Communism means because they are surrounded by it.

THE FREE WORLD'S STAKE IN BERLIN:

West Berlin is a lighthouse of freedom in a dark totalitarian sea. It is a showcase for the material superiorities of a free society which allows and encourages individual initiative. More important, it is a shining model of political, intellectual, and spiritual freedom, in which individual liberties

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are assured and the people choose those who govern them.

For the peoples held in captivity behind the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe, West Berlin is a beacon of hope--a hope nourished since 1948 by the ability of the Western Powers and the Berliners to maintain its freedom.

For the peoples of East Berlin and East Germany, the special status of Berlin holds the hope of their eventual reunion with the people of the Federal Republic in a united democratic German nation. Meanwhile, for such of them as are able to visit it, Free Berlin provides a life-sustaining breath of oxygen.

For the peoples of East Berlin and East Germany who can no longer endure Communist tyranny, Free Berlin is the escape hatch to freedom.

Of all this, Khrushchev and his German Communist puppets are painfully aware. That is why Berlin is to them a "cancerous tumor" and a "bone stuck in our throat."

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For the Western Allies, Free Berlin is the symbol, the evidence, and the acid test, of their unity, strength, and determination. It has become in a real sense the keystone of the defensive arch of NATO. Were the Western Allies to permit the freedom of West Berlin to be lost, whether by direct assault or erosion, they would be false to their pledges. Who would trust their word again? And if the Western Allies, who are the backbone of the security of the free world, should falter and fall apart, what hope would remain for freedom anywhere?

Americans are proud of the role of their own struggle for independence and the great ideas enunciated by its leaders in inspiring other peoples to throw off the yokes of despotism and imperialism. They believe that the American Revolution was the beginning of a "new order of the ages." (The words "novus ordo seclorum" are inscribed on the Great Seal of the United States.) They believe with Abraham Lincoln that it was "meant for all mankind." (check accuracy of quote) In the 19th and early 20th centuries

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they rejoiced in the liberation of peoples and growth of democratic self-government in Latin America and Europe. In the last 15 years they have rejoiced in the emancipation of the peoples of Asia and Africa and their rise to "the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them." They believe that these same ideas which have swept over so much of the earth--of self-determination, personal liberty, and individual dignity--are rooted in the nature of man and will eventually sweep over and bury the spurious doctrine of the inevitable triumph of Communism.

Meanwhile, however, freedom must be protected from destruction by force. In the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk: "The central issue of the crisis is the announced determination to impose a world of coercion upon those not already subjected to it.At stake is the survival and growth of the world of free choice and free cooperation" That

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central issue, he pointed out, "is posed between the Euro-Soviet empire and all the rest, whether allied or neutral; and it is now posed in every continent."*

Berlin is a focal point in the struggle between the world of coercion and the world of free choice. In defending Free Berlin we defend not only Bonn, Paris, London, Oslo, Ottawa, Washington, Kansas City, Boise-- in fact every citizen in the North Atlantic community. Equally we defend New Delhi, Kuala Lumpur, Tokyo, Lagos, Tunis, Cairo, Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, and every other city and village and people who wish to be free.**

* (Address at National Press Club, Washington, July 10, 1961.)

** (It is pertinent to note that approximately 20 of the independent nations belonging to the United Nations are less populous than West Berlin.)

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All peoples throughout the globe who enjoy or aspire to freedom, including the captive peoples in the Communist empires, have a vital stake in the freedom of West Berlin. They can join the stout-hearted Free Berliners in saying to Khrushchev and his Communist proconsuls what two emissaries of a free city of ancient Greece said to a Persian proconsul who asked them why they did not submit to the Persian tyrant, Xerxes. They replied, according to Herodotus: "You have experience of half the matter; but the other half is beyond your knowledge. The life of a slave you understand; but, never having tasted liberty, you can never know whether it be sweet or not. But ah!, had you known what freedom is, you would bid us fight for it, not with the spear only, but with the battle-axe."

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SUGGESTED ANNEXES

1. Soviet Aide-memoire of June 4, 1961
2. U. S. Reply to Soviet Aide-memoire, June 18, 1961
3. The President's statement at his press conference,
July 19, 1961.
4. The President's TV and Radio Address to the American
People, July 25, 1961.
5. Excerpts from statements and speeches of Walter Ulbricht,
No. 1 Communist of East Germany.
6. Bibliography of Official Publications on Berlin and Germany.

THREE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ON BERLIN:

"We cannot and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin, either gradually or by force. For the fulfillment of our pledge to that city is essential to the morale and security of West Germany, to the unity of Western Europe, and to the faith of the whole free world."

President John F. Kennedy, July 26, 1961
(From his report to the Nation by TV and Radio)

"The world must know that we will fight for Berlin. We will never permit that city to fall under Communist influence. We are defending the freedom of Paris and New York when we stand up for freedom in Berlin."

President John F. Kennedy, 1961
(Statement for special issue of Berliner Illustrirte)

"We have no intention of forgetting our rights or of deserting a free people. Soviet rulers should remember that free men have, before this, died for so-called 'scraps of paper' which represented duty and honor and freedom...We cannot try to purchase peace by forsaking two million free people in Berlin...We will not retreat one inch from our duty."

President Dwight D. Eisenhower, March 10, 1959
(Report to the American people, delivered by television and radio)

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"I made the decision ten days ago to stay in Berlin...I insist we will stay in Berlin come what may."

President Harry S. Truman, July 19, 1948
(From his diary)

(This should be double-checked with source:
William Hillman's book, "Mr. President",
page 140, published in 1952)

FIVE SECRETARIES OF STATE ON BERLIN:

"The United States and its Allies have assumed certain basic obligations to protect the freedom of the people of West Berlin. Western forces are in the city by right and remain there to protect those freedoms. The people of West Berlin welcome and support those forces whose presence gives tangible expression to our obligation. It is obvious that the United States could not accept the validity of any claim to extinguish its position in Berlin by unilateral action."

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, June 22, 1961

(Statement at news conference)

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"One fact must be faced squarely. Fear and appeasement will not in the long run reduce the danger of war. Only courage and a firm stand on our rights and principles can do this. Once the Communist rulers soberly realize the depth of our solemn Berlin commitment, we believe they will refrain from putting to trial by force the present right and obligation of the Western Powers to preserve the freedom of the people of West Berlin."

Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, May 7, 1959
(Television and radio address to the American people)

"We possess rights in relation to Berlin which derive from the wartime agreements. We do not believe that the Soviet Union can evade those obligations by setting up a puppet regime in East Germany and East Berlin and claim that it now has authority. We plan to hold the Soviet Union to its very formal and clear obligations with respect to Berlin and access to Berlin...."

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, December 20, 1956
(News conference)

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"We have given notice, in plain and unmistakable language, that we are in Berlin as a matter of right and duty, and we shall remain in Berlin until we are satisfied that the freedom of this city is secure. We have also indicated in unmistakable terms that we shall regard any attack on Berlin from whatever quarter as an attack against our forces and ourselves."

Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson, June 29, 1952
(Address at laying of cornerstone of American Memorial Library, Berlin)

"We are in Berlin as a result of agreements between the Governments on the areas of occupation in Germany, and we intend to stay...."

Secretary of State George C. Marshall, June 30, 1948
(From press statement)

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This is unknown to
State Department's White
Paper from Berlin

BLP